

An Overview Of Public Perception Of Internal Security Management Of Jos Crises 2001-2014.

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Abstract ;This paper attempt to know the perception of the residents of Jos metropolis on the internal security management of Jos crises from 2001-2014 the years that witnessed the violent expression of ethno-religious and political crises and the implication for the recurring breach of peace in the state capital and environs. The growing erosion of internal security in Jos and the responses it elicited from the people raise several pertinent questions regarding the management of internal security in Nigeria and Jos in particular. Previous studies were undertaken to unearth the causes, effects of the violent bouts and the way out but none of the researches attempted to assess the perception of residents on the security strategies adopted to curtail the crises, which has become intractable, and is characterized as political and ethno-religious mainly between Christian category and Muslims category. The continuous manipulations of these socially constructed categories trigger and drive violence in the city which created an overwrought atmosphere of anxiety, hostility and suspicion. The immediate response from the Federal and Plateau State Governments to the violent unrests has been the deployment of military forces in addition to the Police, and the setting up of commissions of enquiry. The paper adopted explanatory type of research and relied on secondary data. After a carefully analysis, the paper recommends amongst others; a review of the 1999 constitutional provisions on citizenship to address the issue of indigene/settler dichotomy, the strengthening of the security architecture not only in Jos but throughout the country and the implementation of some recommendations of various commissions of inquiry on crises that rocked Jos.

Keywords: *Security, Internal Security Management, Public Perception.*

I. INTRODUCTION

The research on public perception of internal security management has attracted very little attention among Nigerian academics. Even though, internal security forms the baseline of a nation's defence, it has at best, received only a peripheral treatment in strategic literature, because only priority concern is given to the nation's preparedness to meet its external adversaries in Nigeria. The perception of the public on internal security management is very critical to the order and stability of any country, because the essence of the state is the promotion of good life and the creation of better conditions that would enhance the welfare of the citizenry. The state cannot perform its first primary purpose, unless the maintenance of law and order is effectively achieved. Therefore, internal security is quite an important aspect of national security and development. It was for lack of security that the Hobbesian state of nature rendered life brutish, nasty and short (Egbefo & Salihu, 2014). The security problem has been a central concern of humanity, probably since the beginning of history. Security deals with the fundamental requirements of existence for human beings and, in fact, for all creatures. Without security, absolutely, no human activity can take place. Similarly, insecurity, the opposite of security is a threat to the continued existence of mankind as a whole (Muhammad-Baba, 2012)

From 1999 to date, Nigeria has experienced considerable erosion of internal security. This is evidenced by the increasing proliferation of political, communal and ethno-religious violence and the prominent place the issue of internal security has enjoyed in the political agenda of various political parties in the recently concluded 2015 General Elections. Bande (2015) emphasized that, by far the most threatening feature in Nigeria's security environment is the *Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda' Awati Wal Jihad* (Boko Haram) insurgency. The group has employed various tactics of terror on the population, aimed at destroying the basis of the country's national cohesion and stability, thus weakening the government; thereby creating favourable conditions to impose its will. Mijah (2007) averred that, since the return of democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed a relative deterioration of its internal security. This is worrisome because internal security crises are inherent with tendencies that threaten national unity and cohesion, discourage investments and retard development. In a research conducted on citizenship crisis in Nigeria, Alubo (2006) argued that over 80 major eruptions of violence took place between May 1999 and December 2003 in Nigeria, which he noted, were three-fold the

number that occurred during the eight year rule of General Babangida regime between 1985 and 1993. He also stated that 300,000 deaths during the period would not be an over estimate. The research of Alubo does not capture two major crises that erupted in Jos, that of 2008 and 2010 and others that happened elsewhere in Nigeria. Nigeria has witnessed over 90 violent ethno-religious, communal, political etc conflicts of varying intensity and magnitude (Elaigwu, 2005). Added to and or as a result of this, is the palpable feeling of growing insecurity due, in large parts, to rising crime rates and increasing constriction of space for effective popular participation. This conjecture elicited a wide range of reactions from the populace, and the Nigerian State too, (Mohammed, 2005). On either side, some of the reactions further eroded the basis of internal security as the citizens have lost confidence on the institutions constitutionally empowered to protect them.

Abdulrahman(2001) explained that ethnic conflicts or antagonisms cannot be completely eradicated or decreed out existence, and while it is true that ethnic movements do perform some function for the political development of nation states, the disruptive effects of ethnic violence have to be drastically curtailed if peace and therefore, development are to be attained. This necessary curtailment of ethnic violence requires an adequate understanding of its roots cause(s), the course it takes, the intervening factors or variables and the potential outcome of the complex series of events which go into its making.

The year 2001, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2011 saw extensive violence, generally pitting communities of Hausa and Fulanicategory (overwhelmingly Muslim) against Berom, Afizere and Anaguta category (predominantly Christians) in Jos metropolis (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) 2014). At least 4,000 and possibly as many as 7,000 people had been killed in 2001 when the first major riot in more than three decades broke out in Jos (Geneva Declaration, 2011). Fourteen years later, only a heavy presence of military and police forces ensured a fragile calm in the city because tensions between ethnic groups rooted observed to have been in the allocation of resources, electoral competition, fears of religious domination, and contested land rights have amalgamated into an explosive mix. The presence of well-organized armed militia groups in rural areas, the proliferation of weapons and the sharp rise in gun fatalities within Jos, have all pointed to the real risk of future large-scale violence and have posed a great threat to internal security (Krause, 2011). It is against this backdrop that this paper takes as a point of departure to know the perception of residents of Jos metropolis and analysts on the internal security management of the crises.

Perceptions and sensing represent a unique source of how to experience something. Since cognition was at first the domain of philosophy, it is obvious philosophers were also the first group of people to study the issues of perception. Antique thinkers such as Democritus and others developed mainly speculative theories (about atomic structures eidolon being received by our senses), on the basis of which they tried to explain how we perceive something. Aristotle chose a similar way of thinking, although a less materialistic one (the shapes entering our mind) and the stoics had their own conception as well (Démuth, 2013).

Psychologists defined perception as the stage at which meanings attached to sensation (Myers, 1999). The perception in this work means the interpretation and evaluation of the crises and the security measures employed during and after the crises and its experiences. The goal of perception is to assess the peoples' experiences, views, opinions and suggestions about the security measures and strategies taken and to make valuable recommendations on how to end the reoccurrence of the crises. To know the minds of the publics in Jos, the paper attempt to and perceive the available cues, whether in their verbal or nonverbal responses available in secondary data that contain valuable information about the perception of Jos residents on the internal security management in Jos.

The main objective of this paper is to investigate whether there is a relationship between the persistent reoccurrence of the crises and the perception of Jos residence on the security management of the protracted crises. It is also to explain the causes of the political and ethno-religious crises in Jos. To interrogate the role of security agencies and the strategies used in internal security management of Jos crises and to proffer recommendations for resolving the crises once and for all.

Structure of the paper

The paper adopted an explanatory type of research to explain how and why the crises occurred and the measures employed by the Plateau State and Federal Governments in quelling the unrest. The paper had relied on the secondary data to elicit the perception of people on the crises. Therefore, it is designed to give an overview of the issue under discussion. It is divided into five parts. In the preceding section, the foundation of the crises is introduced. In the second section, the internal security situation in Jos, the causes of the political and ethno-religious violence in Jos, the historical sketch of the crises and the Jos crises in context is discussed. In section three, the paper has analyzed the internal security management of the Jos crises from 2001-date. Section four has focused on the public perception of the internal security of Jos, some theoretical explanations, challenges of internal security management and implications of public perception on internal security in Jos crises. In the fifth and concluding section, it is about the summary of the findings.

Conceptual issues

Perception: Social perception involves the processes by which we gain information about our social world. Humans are constantly taking in social information, it is how we become socialized, and learn about, and from, others. Based on social perceptions, we are able to interact with others in appropriate ways. Social perception is important because many of our behaviours are based on the information we get from others and our social world. Our thoughts, feelings, and actions towards others and our social world are dictated to a great degree by how we perceive those others and our social world (Myers, 1999). Therefore, perception of the residents of Jos on the security management of the crises is based on how the residents of Jos metropolitan interpret the security strategies adopted.

In other words, perception is based on the information we have of others in our social world. In this respect, social perception reflects a high level of the cognitive component of our preceding organizing structure, and in terms of activity and feelings, although these are eventual consequences of our social perception. The information we receive from others influences the way we think and feel about others (Myers, 1999). In particular, it leads us to form and hold impressions of others. Impression formation is a particularly powerful social perception. We often form impressions of others with very limited information. It is not unusual for us to form an impression in just a few seconds. Moreover, based on this impression, we often decide that we like or dislike a person and that we are willing to act in specific ways toward the person or situation. As social creatures, we also recognize that other people form impressions of us relatively quickly and easily (Myers, 1999).

Perceiving the social world is a subjective process shaped by an individual's current motivation, emotion, and cognition, as well as his or her more long-standing traits such as personalities, self-schemas, and chronically accessible constructs. An even more extreme position was taken by the philosopher Nietzsche, who suggested that social perception is nothing but the projection of our own idiosyncratic representations onto the world in his claim, "Whoever thought that he had understood something of me had merely construed something out of me, after his own image" (Nietzsche, 1908/1969: 261). Expressed another way, perception is a mental process that elaborates and assigns meaning to the incoming sensory patterns, thus, perception creates an interpretation of sensation. A process that makes sensory patterns meaningful. It is perception that makes these words meaningful, rather than just a string of visual patterns. To make this happen, perception draws heavily on memory, motivation, emotion, and other psychological processes. Perception is essentially an interpretation and elaboration of sensation. Perception brings meaning to sensation, so perception produces an interpretation of the world, not a perfect representation of it. To this end, different categories in the Jos crises have different perceptions on the security management of the crises.

Security: Virtually 29 years out of 55 years of Nigeria's independence were spent under military rule in Nigeria, and the population has become accustomed to a way of life in which social institutions have been significantly influenced by the armed forces through regimented feelings display and control mentality life exhibitions. The concept of security became rigidly militarized, and the management of internal security were manipulated and controlled by officers with a vested interest in protecting their hold on power. Therefore, majority of Nigerians conceived security as strictly and solely an armed forces affair.

To clear the misconception and myopic ideology of defining and understanding the concept of security as a solely military or conventional matter, security connotes images of weapons and weapons systems for defence of cherished values. On the other hand, from a broader and less conventional, human security perspective, security is conceived as a development (DFAIT, 3-4, 1999, UNDO, p 35 2006 cited in Mijah 2007). Okpata and Nwali (2013) posited that security is a state of relatively predictable environmental conditions which an individual or group of individuals may pursue its needs without deception of harm and without fear of disturbances or injuries. *Ipsa facto*, security is a man-made scenario covertly or overtly such that each side has its attendant consequence of peace and/or troubles respectively. Security is also viewed as the condition of feeling safe from harm or danger, the defense, protection and preservation of values, and the absence of threats to acquire values (Terriff, 1991).

Put simply, security is about the survival and the safety conditions of human existence and the imperativeness of security in the society is rightly captured by Rockely and Hill (1981 cited in Nkwede, 2013) opined that the need for security is confirmed with unfailing regularity because the avalanche of problems emanating from lack of it is too enormous. Because of the enormity of problems which lack of security or insecurity creates within individuals, leads society and leadership to rationalize their quests for security, raise and maintain military outfits in order to be strong and effective in the pursuit of safety in the polity. It is this that made Akpuru Aja (2007) to aver that a system maintenance against anarchy or absolute lawlessness is an index of peace and security, stressing that a system in this view could be a community, a state, a nation or the whole world as the case may be. Balogun (2004:1) observed that a man's primary and engaging concern has been that of survival and protection; from the vagaries of nature, natural disasters and from the ill-intentions, inactions and misdeeds of his fellow man. This is amplified by section 14(b) of the Nigerian Constitution (1999), which

states *inter alia* that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”. This view is further reinforced by Usman (2002:15) thus

A secure nation state is one that is able to protect and develop itself so that it can develop its core values, meet the needs of its people and provide them with the right atmosphere of self-improvement.

Flowing from this conception, internal security may be conceived as the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which could attenuate internal cohesion and corporate existence of the nation and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values and socio-political and economic objectives, as well as to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people. This conception is applicable in this paper for several reasons. First, it is more all-encompassing, than the narrow strategic conception, and second, because it gives vent to the intricate connection between public perception and internal security management. The conception of security by McNamara (1968:125) also fits in here and is equally illuminating:

In modern society, security means development, security is not entirely military force though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it; security is not military hardware though it may include it. Security is development and without development, there can be no security.

Thus, the fundamental rationale of a state is about providing for the needs of the individuals or group of individuals. This is why Kenneth Booth (1991) linked security with what he called emancipation. Emancipation, he posits: Is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical human constraints, which stop them from carrying out what they will freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education and political oppression and so on.

Therefore, the concept of security goes beyond military consideration. It embraces economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be constructed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights. A major threat to internal security that Nigeria has been struggling to manage is the Jos crises and political and ethno-religious violence in other parts of the country. The protracted crises in Jos does not only poses threats to internal security of the country alone but to the other components of security which is human security. Security is also linked to human security because human security according to the UN Commission on Human Security (2003) is a concept that combines human protection and development, and interconnects peace, security and sustainable development. Human security says security should not only focus on state level but also on the community and the individual (Bande, 2015). Therefore, in order to achieve lasting peace, the views, opinions and perceptions of residents of Jos regarding the management of the security in the metropolis is pivotal.

Consequently, Plateau state and Federal Governments need to be firm on the ground to stem their authority for real law and order to prevail to prevent the near absence of orderliness where people have to resort to their private and other external organizations for effective security, safety and protection (Ahmed, 2013).

Internal security

Broadly speaking, security can be classified into two via; internal and external perspectives. External security has to do with the security of the nation’s territorial borders and her protection from external aggression while, internal security implies freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion and the corporate existence of the nation and the ability to maintain its vital institutions (Nkwede, 2013). More than a decade and half ago, a narrow scope on internal security was expressed by Iweze, (1990) where he argued that, internal security is the totality of the nation’s equilibrium state which must be maintained to enhance the state performance of its responsibility without unnecessary interruptions from anywhere. Internal security involves the government coordination of all those actions that would guarantee that the equilibrium of state is constantly maintained or quickly brought to normality whenever it is threatened by any form of civil disturbances or distractions from students, political, ethnic or religious groups. The above assertions revealed that internal security suggests freedom from threat and the ability of the government to create and sustain an atmosphere conducive for the pursuit of economic interest by the population without interruptions from anybody. And when there is a threat, it includes the ability of the government to quickly intervene through agents and strategies to minimize the impact on the citizenry. Furthermore, it also includes the capacity of the government to create and maintain agencies and mechanism, and even institution that would guarantee freedom

from danger. Therefore, a threat to life and property be it from the armed robbers, insurgency attacks, civil disturbances, political thuggery, cattle rustling, road blocks that endangered the road users and other distractions are symptomatic of lack of internal security. Elaborating further, Aligwara (2009) submit that security of the individual citizens is the most important thing. He argued that security is for the citizens and not citizens for security and without citizens no security is needed for a vacuum.

Internal security situation in Jos

From the foregoing discussions, it can be deduced that, insecurity is the presence of and/or apprehension of those tendencies that could undermine internal cohesion and corporate existence of the nation and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values and socio-political objectives, as well as meet the legitimate aspirations of the people. It also implies the presence or apprehension of danger to life and property, and the presence of a non-conducive atmosphere for the people to pursue their legitimate interest within the society. It embodies the presence, or apprehension of threat to, and or direct violation of security. It implies threat to the individual's security, the state security and the security of the environment. The number of internally displaced persons since 2001 peaked in 2004, with up to 220,000 people displaced (IRIN, 2005). After the 2008 riot, more than 10,000 were displaced, while violence in 2010 resulted in about 18,000 people fleeing the clashes areas (IRIN, 2010). Numerous houses in Jos have been burned and blackened remnants litter the streets in many parts of the city. A series of bombings and other attacks in recent years have terrorized Jos and the boarder north eastern Nigeria region. Most famous of these was a series of five bombing attacks on Christmas Day, 2011 that left 41 people death, the attack on Eid praying ground resulted to the dead of 20 people and more than 200 were killed in 2012 as a result of clashes between herders (Fulani) and farmers (Berom) (Search for Common Ground, 2013). On 20th May, 2014, 118 people were roasted as a result of a car bomb explosion in a crowded market at the center of Jos city (BBC News, 2014). On December, 12, 2013, 31 died in double bombing in Jos city in front of Mr. Biggs's shop, near the site of May 20 attack (Vanguard Newspaper, 2014) and the recent multiple suicide attacks in Jos, one in a food restaurant and the other in a Ramadan Tafsir gathering leaving at least 16 people dead (PM News Nigeria, 2015).

Similarly, Imobighe (2003) identified threats to internal security in Nigeria to include: religious/political intolerance, mismanagement of resources, subversion and sabotage, espionage, smuggling, alien influx, armed robbery, mutiny/coup d'état, civil unrest and revolutionary insurgency. Some common descriptors of insecurity according to Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpo-Robaro (2013) conceptualize internal security to include: want of safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty and doubt, inadequately guarded or protected, lack of stability, troubled, lack of protection and being unsafe. Beland (2005) defined insecurity as a state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection i.e. lack or inadequate freedom from danger. These definitions reflect physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it fits into many other forms of insecurity such as economic insecurity and social insecurity. The recurring crises in the city of Jos had exposed the laxity of Government at all levels and the security operatives to end the crises to protect the life of citizens. From the above, we can identify the causes of political and ethno-religious violence in Nigeria and Plateau in particular as follows:

Causes of crisis in Nigeria: the Jos experience

One of the major causes of violent conflicts in Nigeria since independence has been the restriction of the political, religious and cultural space to particular groups of people or faithful. In Jos, there are instances where the political space was so narrowed that it became a one ethnic/religious group enclave (Berom/Christian in Jos North and Jos South) (Alubo, 2008). This has in no small measure fanned the embers of discord on the plateau (Osaretin and Akov, 2013). Ethnicity is prominent among the factors driving identity politics and the politics for the control and participation in public space (Alubo, 2011) but it is not a sufficient explanation for the emergence and persistence of antagonism and violence (Abdulrahman, 2012). Most of the ethnic groups in the state have claimed to be indigenes and exist side by side with settlers. As is defined loosely in Plateau and the rest of Nigeria, an indigeneis someone whose genealogy can be traced to particular geo-ethnic space within a local council or state in which s/he is resident. People whose roots are elsewhere, i.e. are indigenes of other states, are regarded and called settlers. This configuration enables groups to assert claims to the ownership of land in a particular space(s), and frequently the power to dictate and control the running of political affairs. However, in the construction of indigene/settler identities, the terrain expands or narrows, depending on the stakes (Alubo, 2006). The assertions of Alubo (2006, 2011) had succinctly identified indigene/settler dichotomy as the major cause of ethno-religious strife in Jos but it is not anadequate reason for violence.

However, ethnic and religious dimensions of the Jos crises have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact it has been found out that disenfranchisement, divide and rule tactics, inequality, and ethnocentrism are the root causes. Diversity in ethnic, communal, political, religious and ethnic configuration is not necessarily the determinant of conflict. Rather, it is the colouration and manipulation of these diverse identities that exacerbates restiveness, violent attacks, hatred and ethnocentrism in Jos city. According to Fearon and Laiton (2003 cited in Osaretin and Akov, 2013), such conflicts are associated with

conditions that favour insurgency, violence, including poverty, which marred financially and bureaucratically weak states. Clearly, the institutional fragility of Plateau state, in terms of its ability to manage diversity and rising inequality between the warring factions, land contestations and cut-throat electoral competitions; have been some of “the underlining causes of violent conflicts in Nigeria and Plateau State in a particular since the enthronement of democratic rule in 1999” (Kwaja, 2009:107). The crises had been worsened by the inability, or unwillingness of the state to deliver on its core functions necessary to meet the citizens’ basic needs and expectations (Osaretin and Akov, 2013). The prevalence of poverty and perceived socio-economic and political marginalization have heightened primordial alignments which have provided the historical ferment for violent conflicts in Nigeria (Osaretin and Akov, 2013). Added to this, widespread unemployment and illiteracy have bred frustrations which have often been given an ethno-religious vent. Another factor that contributed to the continuation of the crisis is the usage of the concept ‘Hausa-Fulani’ joining together two distinct ethnic groups referring the entire Muslim residents of Jos with the exception of Yoruba Muslims which reinforces solidarity from other ethnic groups that are Muslims to support Hausa and Fulani in the crisis hence they have become part of it and vice versa on the part of Hausa and Fulani; conflating all Christians residing as supporters of Berom, Afizere and Anaguta category that are largely Christians in the crises hence party in the conflict.

The Jos crises in context

The Jos crisis of the 7th September 2001 was the beginning of a series of outbreaks of communal violence in recent time, in Jos and elsewhere in Plateau State, continuing in 2002, 2003, and 2004 (International Crisis Group 2006: 15). And the subsequent episodes in 2008, 2010 and 2012 fighting in Plateau State generated some 250,000 IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and eroded the serene atmosphere of once Home of Peace and Tourism. What is popularly known as the Jos crises today is a continuation of the violence that followed the 2001 and November 2008 Jos North Local Government election. Undoubtedly, Jos is the capital of Plateau state of Nigeria and has for some years experienced several ethnic and political clashes among which were the September 2001 and April 2004 conflicts leading to the imposition of State of emergency by the Obasanjo -led administration (Felix, Simon and Angela, 2013). The immediate and remote causes of the Jos crises have been politicized along religious and ethnic lines. Those inclined to the ethnic thesis believed that the crises is a classic case of ethnic cleansing. They argued that the Berom, Anaguta, Afizere, Hausa and Fulani, laying claim to pre-eminence over one another is the main cause of the crises. These struggles between what has been dubbed “indigenes” and “settlers” has dated back to the colonial era and the aforementioned groups have documented evidence to back up their claims (Felix, Simon and Angela, 2013). However, the crises were aggravated in 1991 with the creation of Jos North, Jos East and Jos South Local Government Areas by the Babangida led administration. This administrative restructuring located Berom to Jos South LGA, Anaguta and Afizere in Jos East LGA and Hausa and Fulani in Jos North. However, the crises have now assumed political, religious and socio-economic dimensions, the wanton destruction of human lives and property have become a daily past time of warring groups in Jos. The Jos crises have defied all manners of intervention by the Federal and State Governments. The chronological episodes of Jos crises will be discussed below after a brief background of the genesis of the protracted security challenges that have bedeviled the city of Jos.

Chronicle of Jos crises: some Sociological accounts

This section present the Jos crises in a sequential order beginning from the outburst of violent ethno-religious and political conflicts in 2001 with a view to look at the sociological insight in it.

The 2001 crisis

The 2001 crisis began as a conflict over the appointment of a Jasawa man to public office. This time, the new National Poverty Eradication Coordinator was appointed by the Federal Government under the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo. Nevertheless, the indigenes strongly protested the appointment. Human Rights Watch reported that the Berom youths and the Jasawa Youth Association had sent clearly threatening memos and written exchanges to the Governor of Plateau State before the violence erupted (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2010). Despite these clear indicators and warnings from several NGOs, the government did not undertake any significant preventive measures. Fighting broke out in Congo-Russia, a central poor slum surrounded by Muslim dominated neighbourhoods. A main street had been blocked during Friday prayers, a brawl broke out when a Christian woman tried to pass through the congregation. Tensions over the blocking of the street during Friday prayers had existed for several years (Best, 2007: 66–67). The Mosque at the entrance to the predominantly Christian Congo-Russia neighbourhood had therefore been a place where provocations would easily turn into violent fighting. According to testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch shortly after the riot, Christian and Muslim youths faced each other with homemade weapons. These included arrows, sticks, machetes, and guns. Fighting took place along improvised front lines (HRW, 2001: 9). A strong religious dimension underlined the violent clashes from the first day:

‘Church bells were ringing non-stop and there were Muslim calls to prayer throughout the night’ (HRW, 2001: 10). Christians were attacked around the University area, next to AngwanRogo. Since

then the entire settlement has become exclusively Muslim. Muslims were attacked and driven out of Apata and the mixed neighbourhood of Ali Kazaure became a battleground between both groups. Many have testimonies pointed to the selected targeting of individuals as neighbours took the opportunity to settle private scores during the crisis (HRW, 2001: 10–16).

The 2002–04 killings and the state of emergency

After the 2001 riots, violence has been seen to spill over into rural areas. Numerous clashes erupted between herders and farmers. The southern lowlands of Plateau State bore the brunt of violence. Worst hit were Shendam, Wase, and Langtang North and South LGAs. Other areas such as Kanam, Kanke, Mikang, and Pankshin LGAs experienced fewer clashes. Rural fighting killed between 1,000 and 2,000 people between the years 2002 and 2004 (Krause, 2011). Given the poor accessibility of rural villages, exact numbers are impossible to obtain (Best, 2008). Violent clashes broke out subsequent to a political crisis in the town of Yelwa in Shendam Local Government Area. The creation of new Districts resulted in open conflict over district boundaries and political control. The presence of local vigilante groups facilitated mobilization along ethnic and religious lines. By 2004, more than 100 villages had been attacked, damaged, or destroyed by well-armed militia groups. The state security forces appeared to have been largely absent during the escalation of violence in the lowlands. For example, for almost two years militia groups managed to block the road between Wase and Langtang, isolating Wase, preventing Muslims from plying the road to-and-fro. According to Higazi, ‘the main protagonists were generally small, highly mobile, well-armed groups with excellent local knowledge and familiarity with the bush’ (Higazi, 2008: 3–4).

The retaliation from Christian groups two months later was fierce: well-armed groups killed about 700 Muslims in Yelwa (Higazi, 2008). The attack was thoroughly planned and coordinated and did not involve only Christians from the immediate neighbourhood but were from Langtang North and South with the help of a guide from Yelwa who showed them the targeted houses of Muslims and unleashed their terror. After the Yelwa killings, President Obasanjo declared a six-month state of emergency in Plateau State. Governor Joshua Dariye was suspended and retired Major General Chris Alli was put in place as Administrator. His administration made serious efforts to retrieve illegal firearms from rural communities in exchange for cash (AFP, 2004). In 2005 and 2006 violent clashes erupted in the town of Namu in Quan-Pan (close to Shendam), killing at least 100 people (This Day, 2010). Many Muslims displaced from Yelwa permanently resettled in Bauchi (Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 2005). The State of Emergency left the political conflict in Jos completely unaddressed.

The 2008 crisis: Jos-North Local Government Council Election

The Chairman of Jos North, who was elected in 1999, left office in 2002. No Local Government elections took place until November 2008. The State Government suspended elections in the riot-hit area due to security concerns despite protests by the Jasawa community (Mohammed, 2007). The Jasawa elite had been in negotiations about broader political inclusion and offices for their community with Governor Jonah Jang over several years. Jang refused to cooperate with the Jasawapeople and planned to campaign without Muslim support. Ostien sums up the situation when he states that when the Plateau State Local Government elections took place, ‘the stage was set . . . as a showdown between Jang and the Jasawa’ in Jos North LGA (Ostien, 2009). While the indigenes secured the support of Churches for their political campaign on the PDP ticket, the Jasawa allied with the Afizere on the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) platform. Ostien reports that ANPP supporters were convinced that Jang and the PDP could never win Jos North LGA (Ostien, 2009). Both Churches and Mosques strongly called on their congregations to vote only for a Christian or a Muslim candidate, respectively.

The Pastors were preaching in the Churches that everyone should go out to vote, that they must not vote for any Muslim, the Muslims are infidels and we must not have them ruling over us. They want to Islamize the place. Don’t vote for any unbeliever (Ostien, 2009).

Both sides were prepared to make use of all forms of rigging practices to win Jos North LGA. The losing party would simply have been ‘out-rigged’ (Ostien, 2009). Although the election process itself went smoothly and peacefully, both parties had youth groups following the stages of vote collection and the transportation of ballot boxes to the collation centers to ‘guard’ their votes. However, the Jos North LGA collation center had been relocated and neither side had been properly informed about it. This fuelled suspicions among the Jasawa that their votes would be lost. Tensions rose when the both sides’ youth groups waited at the new collation center for the announcement of the results. Eventually, they were forcibly dispersed by the Police. Before long, youth gangs went on the rampage through the city, killing, burning, and looting in the central neighbourhoods (Ostien, 2009). According to local counts of victims, at least 700 and possibly more than 850 people were killed. The Muslim community alone reported ‘632 lives lost, over 5000 injured, 20 Islamic schools

destroyed, 22 Mosques burnt and 891 residential buildings destroyed' (Jos North Muslim Ummah, 2009). The Catholic Community reported 23 people killed and at least 600 houses and shops burnt or destroyed (JDPC, 2010). Christian communities submitted victim numbers and memoranda to the Plateau State Judicial Commission of Inquiry ('Ajibola Commission'), which was established following the crisis. The Stefanos Foundation reported 103 Christian's dead in Congo-Russia, Nassarawa, Rikkos, the SarkinMangu area, and Tudun Wada, and 330 houses burnt in Jos North (PSJCI, 2010:259–63). In addition, the Commission report states that 118 Christian Igbo and 31 Yoruba were killed (PSJCI, 2010: 266–70). At least 118 people died in extra-judicial killings perpetrated by security forces, who gunned down unarmed citizens in their homes, chased and killed men trying to flee to safety, and lined up victims on the ground and summarily executed them (HRW, 2009: 9). According to CAN, at least 10,000 people were displaced (Dung-Gwom and Rikko, 2009). The detailed memorandum by the Jos North Muslim Ummah lists how each victims were killed. As Higazi (2008) notes, the number of gunshot fatalities is striking and suggests that guns were much more widely used than in the previous 2001 riot. Almost 90 per cent of Muslim victims died of gunshots (Jos North Muslim Ummah, 2009).

The 2010 crisis

The 2010 crisis erupted on the morning of 17 January, a Sunday. The context of the outbreak of violence remains disputed. Muslims have claimed that a Muslim was attacked while reconstructing his house, which had been burnt down during the 2008 crisis in DutseUku, within the city center. Christians argued that the reconstruction project was just a pretext to stir up trouble in the area. They maintained that the owner of the house brought hundreds of armed men to work on his construction site, insulting Christian passers-by and attacking them (CMG, 2010 cited in Higazi 2011). The Muslim owner of the house contends that Christians tried to prevent him from finishing the roof of the house and threatened to burn down his house again. According to Higazi's interview with the Muslim house owner, 'Christians mobilized, blowing whistles and asking people to "come out and fight for Jesus"' (Higazi, 2011). Attempts to solve the dispute through the Ward Head or to call in soldiers to prevent an escalation failed. The situation led to a brawl. Shortly afterwards, a nearby Church was apparently attacked and destroyed. Again, the crisis spilled out beyond the city center. Neighbourhoods that had remained peaceful until 2008, such as Anglo Jos, became sites of violent battles, looting and destruction.

During the following days and weeks, massacres took place on the outskirts of the city. On 19th January 2010, at least 150 Muslims were killed in KuruKarama (HRW, 2010). In a reprisal attack, at least 200 Christians died in DogoNahauwa on 7 March 2010 (HRW, 2010). In both places all women, children, and the elderly who did not manage to hide or escape were killed. The trauma of both massacres weighed heavily on the population of Jos. Both sides often refer to KuruKarama or DogoNahauwa to point out the extreme cruelty of the killers. The presence of neighbourhood vigilante groups before the 2001 riots provided a youth network for local defence. These youths have clearly been involved in attacks and counter-attacks (Higazi, 2011). Within the city centre, the heavy presence of security forces inhibits such movement of militia groups. Many residents in the central poor neighbourhoods fear the presence of youths and gang leaders. Once violence breaks out, local youths are often drawn into the fighting as joiners who expect opportunities for looting, but also as defenders of their neighbourhood. (Nigerian Observer, 2011). The year 2010 ended with the Christmas Eve bombings that was detonated in predominantly Christian market areas, when residents were making final purchases for the festivities. According to Human Rights Watch, 107 people died in the bomb attacks, and numerous people were wounded (HRW, 2011). *Jama'atuAhlus-SunnahLidda'AwatiWal Jihad* (Boko Haram) claimed responsibility for the bombings. State officials, Islamic clerics, journalists, and residents in Jos have doubted the authenticity of this claim (This Day 2010 & Al-Jazeera 2010). The bombings were swiftly followed by renewed inter-communal fighting within the center of Jos. While it is difficult to estimate how many people died in the 'silent killings', the total death toll for 2010 certainly exceeds 1,000 victims. Human Rights Watch also estimates more than 1,000 victims for 2010 (HRW, 2011), while both Muslim and Christian representatives have claimed higher number of casualties and victims in the January and March 2010 violence. After exhaustive accounts of the crises, the next section will be on how the crises have been handled or managed by the security operatives as well as the role of Plateau state and Federal Governments in the crises.

Internal security management of Jos crises

Internal security management refers to the articulated principles governing the management of a nation's internal security. Such principles governing the nation's security flow from the national ideology or the basic philosophy of public affairs. According to Imobighe (1990 cited in Amujiri and Agu, 2013) doctrine of internal security should seek to answer not only the why and how of internal security management but also the question of the basic nature of the internal security goals desired to achieve (Amujiri and Agu, 2013). With particular reference to internal security management, Nigeria lacks a clearly defined security policy. Nweke (1990 cited in Amujiri and Agu, 2013) noted that while periodic reviews of Nigeria foreign policy were undertaken and results implemented, one can confidently assert that officially and for several years, Nigeria

operated without an obvious internal security policy. Imobighe (1990) lamented that, what is generally available by way of internal security management are more or less principles meant for handling particular internal emergencies. The result is that, internal security management in Nigeria simply responds to the same conservative and coercive power politics doctrines that apply to the wider issues of national and global defence in handling domestic political and ethno-religious conflicts. Given this basic conservative strategy or doctrine of internal security management, it is understandable why there is the tendency for national security planners or handlers to respond by strengthening the coercive apparatus of Government anytime the nation is faced with internal security challenges in most cases. Little attention is paid to the non-coercive responses which, at times, are most cost-effective, apart from the fact they have the salutary effect of saving the nation the unnecessary anxiety of partial or full mobilization of the country's security forces. As Imobighe (1990 cited in Amujiri and Agu, 2013) and Gambo (1988 cited in Amujiri and Agu, 2013) noted, Nigeria is a victim of conservative and coercive approach to internal security management as distinct from the positive and non-coercive response which seek to remove causes of discontent and internal strife, by minimizing socio-economic hardship and inequalities which would solve and prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflicts in Jos.

Central to the crises in Jos city, a wide range of mechanisms were employed to curb the perennial political and ethno-religious skirmishes in Plateau state particularly Jos metropolis which is the epicenter of the crises by the Federal and State Governments to find a lasting solution to the recurrent violent encounters in the Tin city because the conflicts have taken other non-violent forms to full blown violence, killings and destruction of properties. Around Jos, Muslims who lived in predominantly Christian neighbourhoods have moved out. Christians too who lived in predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods have also moved to other spaces (Best, 2008). In effect, ethno-religious divide has led to new and various Christian and Muslim enclaves in the Plateau State capital, thereby reinforcing the claims of who owns the city, possesses numerical strength and might during crises. The following measures have been found to have been employed to help manage the crises:

Military

The immediate response of the Plateau State and Federal Governments to arrest violent unrest in Jos has been the deployment of military in addition to the police operations and the imposition of dusk-to-dawn curfews. During the State of Emergency in 2004, efforts were made to collect illegal weapons from militants, particularly in Southern Plateau. After the 2008 crisis, a Special Task Force (STF) comprising the military (Nigerian Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the Police forces was established. It regularly patrolled well-known flashpoints within the city to quell possible unrest. The STF engaged in weapons searches at checkpoints on the routes leading to Jos and major streets in the city. Since 2010 a constant heavy military presence remained within the city to secure an uneasy calm (Krause, 2011). The Nigerian Armed Forces and the police personnel have, from available records, maintained a track record of effective peace-keeping campaigns around the globe (Dode, 2012). This record of success has earned for the nation, a number of international recognitions and commendations (Dode, 2012). With such high profile rating in the way they have been conducting themselves when on international peace-keeping operations, it was expected that the Nigerian armed forces would display the same record while on national (internal) peace-keeping operations. A number of factors however, tend to expose some problems inherent in the way they have handled internal crisis flash-points, to which they have been drafted to maintain peace. A number of analysts of these internal operations have pointed to the problem of high handedness and insensitivity to the nature and characteristics of civilian dominated areas. The dust usually left behind crisis scenes in Nigeria by the military personnel (drafted to such areas) have always left much to be desired. Examples of places where the military forces have left behind such woes are Umuechem, Odi and Gbaramatu, ZakiBiem, Jos, Maiduguri, etc. (Dode, 2012).

Operation Rainbow (OR)

Operation Rainbow (OR) is a military-civil security force established in June 2010 as a joint initiative between the Federal and State government. It has brought together personnel from the Special Task Force (STF), Mobile Police (MOPOL), the Nigeria Police, Department of State Services (DSS) and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence (NSCD). With support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (NSRP, 2014), according to NSRP (2014), Operation Rainbow (OR) has been able to set up an early warning and early response infrastructure. This system includes a situation room that relies on information from trained persons across all the 17 local government areas of Plateau state. OR's human security programme also includes skills acquisition and leadership training for women and youth, organized in conjunction with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), also known in some cases as civil society organizations (CSOs). This is why the International Crisis Group has described OR as one of the most holistic responses to the Jos crisis. But the security outfit has not achieved the objective behind its establishment of preventing violent attacks in most parts of the state including the multiple bombings in markets, Churches, open air places, Mosques and extra-judicial killings (2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015) in Jos metropolis after its formation because the real causes of the crises were left unaddressed.

Commissions of Enquiry

There have been several commissions of enquiries and strategies set up to study the causes of violent conflicts in Jos to proffer workable solutions. Unfortunately, until the present moment, the government responses to the conflict have been widely “perceived as ineffective” (Kwaja, 2011:2). At least, 16 public commissions have been launched to examine the conflict and to identify solutions. Also many other studies have been conducted by independent groups. As noted by Kwaja (2011), there is little or no political will to act on these findings. Federal and State governments have regularly worked at cross-purposes, sharply disagreeing on the measures to mitigate the recurring conflict in Jos, while the involvement of civil society groups has more or less had a polarizing effect in most cases. The establishment of other Commissions of Enquiry or equivalent bodies to look into the outbreaks of violence and their causes has been one of the most characteristic strategy by the Federal and State Government to manage the recurring conflicts in various part of Plateau state (NSRP, 2014). Since 1994 such bodies include:

- Justice AribitonFiberesima Commission of Enquiry of 1994 into the riots of 12thApril 1994 in Jos metropolis.
- Justice Nikki Tobi Commission of Enquiry of 2001 into the crisis of 7thSeptember 2001 in Jos North.
- Justice Jummai Sankey Judicial Commission of Enquiry of 2001 into Communal Conflicts in Wase LGA.
- Rev. Dr Pandang Yamsat High Powered Committee on Peace and Security in Plateau State set up in 2002.
- Mr Musa Izam-led Administrative Committee and the Justice Constance Momoh Judicial Commission of Enquiry into the Namu conflicts of Quanpan LGA, in 2005.
- Justice Bola Ajibola Commission of Enquiry of 2009 to look into the crisis of 28thNovember 2008 in Jos North LGA as a result of the local government elections conducted that year.
- General Emmanuel Abisoye Panel of Inquiry of 2009.
- Solomon Lar Presidential Administrative Panel of 2010

However, the implementation of the recommendations of these commissions has always been hampered by the same political polarization that has been driving the conflicts themselves. For example, the Jasawa community boycotted the Ajibola Commission, chaired by a former Attorney General of the Federation (Justice Bola Ajibola), because they believed it was biased against them as it was appointed by the Plateau State Government. This community has expressed more faith in the bodies set up by the Federal government, including the General Emmanuel Abisoye Panel of Inquiry of 2009 and the Solomon Lar Presidential Administrative Panel in spite of the fact that Bola Ajibola is a Muslim while Emmanuel Abisoye and Solomon Lar were Christians.

Due to the activities of the security agencies in containing the crises situations, residents of Jos and analysts alike had expressed divergent views and opinions based on their perception of how security agencies are managing the internal security of Jos metropolis and other parts of the state.

Public Perception of Internal Security Management of Jos Crises

The military and police has been involved in the management of internal security in Plateau State since 2001. Civilian-military relations have been characterized by misunderstanding and mistrust, often reinforcing ethno-regional and religious fault lines. There have been allegations by some communities (Jos North, Jos South and Riyom) that the military have been reluctant to defend or protect them, and have themselves committed atrocities with impunity (Search for Common Ground, 2013). Communities (Tudun Wada, Ung. Rukuba, Riyom) have reported military indiscipline and unprofessionalism, including harassment at checkpoints and the violation of their rights as citizens. This claim is faulty, clashes between military and youths of Berom, Afizere and Anaguta result of the soldiers preventing them from taking law into their on hands to attack the other category in the conflict. The Plateau state’s government response to violence is circumscribed by the fact that all security agencies are controlled from the federal level, and the state governor is obliged to channel security requests through Abuja, which can inhibit timely response to violence (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), 2014). In addition, although the State Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice has the power of prosecution, the power to arrest lies with the police, a federal government institution. This situation, coupled with the frequent transfer of Investigative Police Officers (IPOs), has hampered the prosecution of perpetrators of violence and weakened the criminal justice system of the state (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), 2014) in contrast, the Plateau State Government appeared to have take side in the crises with the Christian category, in terms of its utterances, provision of relief materials and compensation. Some security experts expressed dissatisfaction on the Federal government’s strategy of relying largely on a military approach to end the crises in Jos which has proved the incapacity of the military approach to deliver a lasting solution. Former Chief of Defence Staff, General Martin Luther Agwai (Rtd.) opined that, “You can never solve any of these problems with entirely military solutions. The military can always be an enabling force. They can only sensitize the warring people; they can only stabilize the crisis-ridden area during the crises situation (but) it is a political issue; it is a social issue; it is an economic issue, and until these issues

are addressed, the military can never give you a final solution” (International Crisis Group, 2014). The military intervention is only ad-hoc in nature. They cannot remain in crisis prone areas forever.

Another agency constitutionally saddled with the responsibility of maintaining law and order in Nigeria is the Nigeria Police Force, which has been an active player in managing the security of Jos and has been under heavy public criticisms on the way and manner it have been handling crises in Nigeria particularly in Jos since 2001. Odekunle (2004) observed that the central and sub objectives of policing and the importance of policing to the society and the citizens’ perception of the government (which the Police is seen as representing) cannot be overestimated. He shows the importance of the police in his observation of their duties as the government officials most proximate to crime, temporally and procedurally the leading figures in crime prevention/control and in the law enforcement process. Odekunle maintained that the Policemen’s honesty, integrity and observance of procedural laws in handling crisis, unrest, civil disturbances, offenders and non-offenders have deep implications for the citizens’ perception of fairness and justice and for the degree of respect the average citizen has for the law. Odekunle averred that the policemen’s behaviors affect the citizens’ opinion about their government, being the most visible compared to courts or prisons and as well as being the visible primary or main government authority legally authorized to use force on citizens when necessary (Odekunle, 2004:26).

The view of Odekunle is aptly captured by American Human Right Watch which documented 118 cases of alleged arbitrary killings by the security forces that took place between 7 a.m. and 1 p.m. on November 29, 2009 alone. The majority of killings documented by the Human Rights Watch were allegedly committed by the Nigerian Police (Human Right Watch, 2009). In 15 separate incidents of arbitrary killings by the Police, at least 74 men and boys, all but two of them Muslims, were killed. The vast majority of police killings were perpetrated by the anti-riot Police, the Mobile Force, commonly referred to as the mobile police or MOPOL (Human Right Watch, 2009). Substantiating further, Alemika and Chukwuma (2000:5) in their exquisites’ argument stated that, the Police work embodies ironies. The Police have been noted their inactions to be instruments of oppression and exploitation in a totalitarian and unjust social system. Yet they are essential to the preservation of justice and democracy being the statutory duties.... The police are supposed to be the guardians of social order. As an institution, the police force, helps to preserve, fortify and reproduce the prevailing social order, and are hardly catalysts for its change. Thus when a social order is oppressive, exploitative and unjust, the police supposed to preserve it by suppressing and defusing the demand for democracy and the elimination of oppression and injustices. Similarly, in a democratic, just and equitable society, police have greater chances of serving as the vanguards for social democracy, human rights and social and economic justice.

This view justifies the critics’ (such as Alemika, Chukwuma, Odekunle) notion that the Nigerian police are pro-government (Plateau State Government) while the public see them as unfriendly with the penchant to unleash terror, particularly the Jasawa community in Jos North and parts of Jos South during the crises. Nobody really wants to have anything to do with the police, if they could be avoided, majority of the Muslim communities in Jos would like to avoid them at the slightest opportunity because the Human Rights Watch had documented eight incidents involving the alleged arbitrary killing of 59 men by the Police and military during the crisis that sprang after the 2008 Local Government Election in Jos North (Higazi, 2011). According to witnesses in Jos, all of these victims were Muslim men, most were young, and nearly all were unarmed at the time they were killed. Human Rights Watch believes the actual number of arbitrary killings by security forces may be substantially higher than the reported figures of 59 men (Higazi, 2011). Alemika (2003) was of the opinion that, the agencies of crime management in Nigeria share in common certain problems such as authoritarian or repressive legacy and orientation, lack of consultation with and accountability to citizens; lack of policies that specifically harmonize their operations with democratic principles of criminal justice system; poor funding of activities; poor staffing and inadequate remuneration of staff; inadequate resources; insensibility/insensitivity to and thereby non-utilization of, scientific research, knowledge and expertise in the various academic fields of criminology, penology, sociology of law, criminal justice and law enforcement to improve training, planning, operations, monitoring and evaluation; corruption and lack of institutionalized mechanisms by which the agencies are answerable to the public for their activities and lack of coordination to achieve efficiency.

Most of the Muslims residents of Jos perceived the Jos crises as part of a deliberate ethnic cleansing agenda by the State Government to exterminate specific ethnic groups and creeds in Jos (i.e. the Hausa, and Muslims), using politics as an apparatus (Abba, 2008). The total number of people killed or wounded have always been disputed as each side has accused the other of inflating its casualties and property damages for the sake of propaganda. Each side has accused the other of having planned the fight, the massacre and the destruction, in advance, of arming themselves, bringing in reinforcements from outside, arranging fake army or purchasing fake police uniforms for their partisans, using the security forces, all allegedly instigated and funded by big men behind the scenes, for nefarious reasons variously hypothesized (Abba, 2008). The polarization between religious communities has also been affecting the impartiality of the security forces in Jos metropolis because the Police officers and soldiers have long been blamed for being partial and part of the problem.

Christians accused soldiers of siding with Muslims; Muslims blame Police officers for supporting Christians (Higazi, 2011). The use of fake uniforms in violent attacks has further undermines the effectiveness of security forces and has been fostering fears among the population (Higazi, 2011). The Christian residents have even demanded the withdrawal of security forces although their heavy presence has kept small-scale fighting from turning into full-blown riots. On 31st January 2011, Christian women dressed in black demonstrated against the presence of the Special Task Force (STF), which they perceived as biased (Leadership, 2011). Muslim women clad in white held a counter-protest against the removal of soldiers (BBC, 2011). Both the military and the police are feared for arbitrary killings and have reportedly shot at individuals fleeing violent scenes (HRW, 2009). But their claims cannot be substantiated by an empirical study because the military were able to calm the situation.

Another claims expressed by the Jasawa and the Christian communities on the handling of Jos crises was the accusations and counter accusations which resulted to the setting up of four separate probe panels to look into the remote and immediate causes of the crises and to proffer tangible solutions to avert a reoccurrence. In 2008 The Federal Government panel was led by General Emmanuel Abisoye, while the State Government panel is led by Justice Bola Ajibola. Both Houses of the National Assembly have also set up panels. An interesting issue was that, the constitution and composition of the panels had become more important than the objective of setting them up. The argument as to who has the right to constitute a panel has become an issue of its own; while the causes of the crisis have been left unaddressed. What the above shows is that, residents of Jos have been expressing little trust between the State and Federal Government over the crises. Many statements made by representatives of different sections of the community in Jos and elsewhere have also supported either the Federal or the State position. Justifying the position of the President in setting up an inquiry panel, Mr. Olusegun Adeniyi, the Special Adviser to the President on Media and Publicity accused the Plateau State of being recalcitrant and argued that:

“President Yar’adua’s interest in the investigations into the Jos crisis is simply to unravel the cause of the dispute and prevent future occurrences in the State and elsewhere. In as much as the President respect the principle of Federal structure, he was mindful of his responsibility to all Nigerian’s irrespective of where they reside. The belligerent posture of the Plateau State Government is rather unfortunate. But the President is more interested in the cause of peace than in trading words with anyone (Omuora, 2009)”.

On the other hand in a statement entitled: “Nigeria Needs a President for Both Christians and Muslims”, the Plateau State Christian Consultative Forum” Coordinator, Bishop Anderson Pam Jok argued:

“We are compelled to raise this alarm because of our dwindling faith in the leadership of President Umaru Yar’Adua who swore to protect the integrity of all irrespective of tribe, religion, interest and location. We therefore invite the world to focus on Jos crisis critically and join us to ask questions of commitment in Mr. President’s avowed management of the issue on the ground. The President, with his most powerful wife, the First Lady, Mrs. Turai Yar’Adua, has deliberately avoided the Governor of the state (Jonah Jang) by shunning his entreaties for no stated reason. Governor Jang, just like the President is our elected leader and he is the man on the ground in the State who will rub mind with any other willing authority including the President on how best peace can be achieved. Why is Mr. President shunning the Governor and what peace can that help to achieve? (Omuora, 2009)”.

As the Segun Adeniyi stated, it is the belligerent attitude of the Governor for not cooperating with the Federal Government in finding solution to the crises which led to the setting of parallel investigation panels between State and Federal Government, Gov. Jang and President Yar’Adua appeared to be at loggerheads, hence both State and Federal Governments operate in a different direction.

The Northern Christian Elders Forum (NOCEF) were not satisfied with the Federal Government’s role in managing Jos crises and accused the Federal Government of taking sides in the conflict. The elders said that the attitude of the Federal Government officials, including the wife of the President and the membership of the committee set up by the House of Representatives, clearly showed bias against Christians. According to the Chairman of the Forum:

“Virtually all the Federal Government officials who visited Jos, who are Muslims including the Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General A.B. Danbazzau and the wife of the president, only visited the Central Mosque and places where displaced Muslims were being camped in Jos without visiting displaced Christians in their camps. They did not even have the courtesy to visit the Governor who is the chief security officer of the State nor the traditional ruler of Jos, the GbongGwom Jos, Da Victor Pam”.

The claim of Northern Christian Elders Forum is one sided because it failed to establish whether it is only Muslims delegation that visited Jos since the bout of the violence since Muslims community are claimed that Christian delegation, humanitarian and relief agency of the State and federal government had not visited their camps of displaced persons

An insightful account of the Jos case and, which best captured the situation was the one given by NuhuGagara (the Plateau State Commissioner for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs), who claimed that ([http:// www.elombah.com](http://www.elombah.com) March 2010):

The massacre (March 2010 in Jos) happened for several hours without any military intervention...Soldiers who were belatedly drafted to the scene curiously freed several of the arrested assailants... The soldiers were also withdrawn immediately... Hence, the government (of Plateau State), no longer has confidence in the military to maintain peace in the state.

The same Plateau State Government failed lament the ineptitude of the military when Christians attacked and ransacked Kuru-Karama village, where the entire village was razed down and corpses were stockpiled in holes, well and toilets. These portrayed the State Government bias and support for the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta category in the crises where its quick to denounce and criticize the military whenever Christians are attacked and kept mute when a Muslims are attacked.

In a counter claim, Hausa and Fulanicommunity leader spoke on the genesis of the November 28, 2008 crisis as being the hatred of Plateau State government against the Hausa and Fulani. The Hausa-Fulani Elder's Forum advertorial appearing in the Daily Trust, 12 January 2009, asked “How can we continue to live under this inhuman treatment? The only option open to us is to request for boundary adjustment to relocate to Bauchi State or any arrangement that will separate us from our persecutors at least to save our lives.” (Exhibit JCI/J/135/2009/4 cited in International Crisis Group (2012) the Hausa and Fulani category appears not to trust the state government. Anymore. Security forces especially Nigerian Police not only fail to share intelligence among themselves, they are also suspected of taking sides in the conflict and are accused of trading guns for money. The Muslim community alone reported ‘632 lives lost, over 5000 injured, 20 Islamic schools destroyed, 22 Mosques burnt and 891 residential buildings destroyed’ (Jos North Muslim Ummah, 2009) with the aid of Police and support of Plateau State Government before the arrival of the soldiers. It appears that Hausa and Fulani all along have been pointing accusing finger on the Police and Plateau State Government support the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta category that are predominantly Christians without because the Nigeria Police are control by the Federal Government as such receive order from Inspector General of Police.

From the above views were shrouded with claims, accusation and counter-accusations, opinions and perceptions, it is glaring the divergent perceptions of all categories in Jos crises are influenced by ethno-religious and political motives because issues regarding the crises evoke emotions. It is to this, the paper provide a theoretical explanation on the imbroglio of internal security management of Jos and the reasons for the expression of varying perceptions from all parties in the conflict.

Theoretical Explanations for Perception

The fact that most people perceive most illusions and ambiguous figures in essentially the same way suggests that fundamental perceptual principles are at work. But what are these principles? To find some answers, we will examine two influential theories that explain how we form our perceptions: Gestalt Theory and Learning-Based Inference. Although these two approaches may seem contradictory at first, they really emphasize complementary influences on perception. The Gestalt theory emphasizes how we organize incoming stimulation into meaningful perceptual patterns because of the way our brains are innately “wired.” On the other hand, learning-based inference emphasizes learned influences on perception, including the power of expectations, context, and culture. In other words, Gestalt theory emphasizes nature, and learning-based inference emphasizes nurture.

Perceptual Organization: The Gestalt Theory

About 100 years ago, perceptual tricks captured the interest of a group of German psychologists, who argued that the brain is innately wired to perceive not just stimuli but also patterns in stimulation (Sharps & Wertheimer, 2000). They called such a pattern a Gestalt, the German word for “perceptual pattern” or “configuration.” Thus, from the raw material of stimulation, the brain forms a perceptual whole that is more than the mere sum of its sensory parts (Prinzmetal, 1995; Rock & Palmer, 1990). This perspective became known as Gestalt psychology. The Gestaltists liked to point out that we perceive a square as a single figure rather than merely as four individual lines. Similarly, when you hear a familiar song, you do not focus on the individual notes. Rather, your brain extracts the melody, which is your perception of the overall pattern of notes. Such examples, the Gestalt psychologists argued, show that we always attempt to organize sensory information into meaningful patterns, the most basic elements of which are already present in our brains at birth. The theory explains that the residents of Jos metropolis tend to interpret and analyze the security management of the crises as a whole rather than their efforts in each of the violent outbreaks.

Learning-Based Inference: The Nurture of Perception

In 1866, Hermann von Helmholtz pointed out the important role of learning (or nurture) in perception. His theory of learning-based inference emphasized how people use prior learning to interpret new sensory information. Based on experience, then, the observer makes inference guesses or predictions about what the sensations mean. This theory explains, for example, on a cake: You have learned to associate cakes, candles, and birthdays. Ordinarily, such perceptual inferences are fairly accurate. On the other hand, we have seen that confusing sensations and ambiguous arrangements can create perceptual illusions and erroneous conclusions. Our perceptual interpretations are, in effect, hypotheses about our sensations. In fact, we so thoroughly learn about human faces in their usual configuration that we fail to “see” facial patterns that violate our expectations, particularly when they appear in an unfamiliar orientation. The most important factors include the context, our expectations, and our perceptual set. This theory expounded how residents of Jos metropolis perceive the security management of the crises based on the previous experiences of security operatives handling of the crises hence influence their perception on the present management of the crises.

Theoretical explanations for Crises

Several theories provide theoretical groundings for threat to internal security and challenges of managing the security of a crisis-prone area. The relevant theory that fits the present discourse is a social conflict theory due to its viability to analyze class struggle for economic and political power between two groups of people in any known human society.

Social conflict theory (SCT): According to the proponents of this theory; Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels (1848), it provides the theoretical explanation for competition among social classes, State actors and non-state actors in their attempts to protect their selfish interests. This class struggle leads to the acquisition of weapons and ammunitions for self-preservation thus leading to social conflicts and threats to internal security and management of security operations. This class violence in Jos has serious implications on the public perception of security personnel managing the crises from positive to negative. The philosophical assumptions of social conflict theory view the society as comprised of a moving balance of antithetical forces that generate social change by their tension and struggle. Struggle, rather than peaceful growth, is the engine of progress, strife is the father of all things and social conflict is the core of the historical process (Marx, 1848). The discord between Christians, Muslims, Berom, Hausa and Fulani in an attempt to control the political, economic, social and cultural institutions of Jos has created the atmosphere of tension that translates into violent confrontations at a slightest disagreement or provocation.

Marx and Engels (1848) asserted “The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patricians and plebeians, lords and serfs, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressors and the oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, now in an open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of a society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes”. The basic assumption of the above view is that, ever since human society emerged from its primitive and relatively undifferentiated state, it has remained fundamentally divided between classes who clash in the pursuit of their class interests. The continuous struggle over a political authority and economic resources between the rich and the poor, police and civilians, ruling parties and opposition parties, Christians and Muslims, indigenous ethnic groups, Hausa and Fulani, etcetera in Jos and other parts of Plateau state, validated the basic assumptions of social conflict theory and justified the existence of social conflict in a human society. And the security agencies are the instruments of coercion in the hands of the ruling class, the Christians and indigenous ethnic groups want the withdrawal of the military because they perceived them as acting on the interest of the Federal government contrary to the opinions of Muslim community, Hausa and Fulani in Jos who want the deployment of the military and withdrawal of the police, because they see the Police as taking side with the Plateau State government, Christians and indigenous ethnic groups. In summary, the social conflict theory explains that in a society where domination, exploitation or perceived domination and, the exploitation of

one class or group by a dominant class or group, if this dysfunctional relations is not redressed, it results into an armed struggle and full scale violence which has been the case in Jos and environs in Plateau State, Nigeria since 2001.

The strength, relevance and weakness of social conflict theory in analyzing Jos crises

The social conflict theorists see dissension and conflict at every point in the social system. And whatever order there is in a society, it is stemming from the coercion of some members by those at the top (Ritzer, 2008). The theory emphasizes the role of power in maintaining order in the society, this is where internal security management comes in and the role of security outfits. And it is within the ambit of constitutional responsibility of Government at all levels to prevent, manage and resolve the lingering crises in Plateau state in general and Jos city in particular. The social conflict theory has been able to analyze how the ethno-religious crises in Jos which the dissected communities and people that were hitherto living harmoniously and cordially (especially during the regime of Jonah Jang) into arch-rivals and antagonistic parties between Jasawa community mostly Muslims and indigenous ethnic groups (Berom, Afizere) predominantly Christians. Thus, the major strength and relevance of the social conflict theory is that, it is a macro theory that gives room for analyzing large social structures of the society such as economic, religion, law, security, politics, ethnicity, family etc. And the weakness is that, it is a macroscopic theory which has little to offer to the understanding of individual actors' thought, role and action in causing and preventing the perennial crises and managing internal insecurity in Jos since 2001 effectively.

The challenges of internal security management in Jos

Maintaining internal security in Jos since the beginning of Jos crises in 2001 has been hampered by a number of challenges. The challenges are as follows: The major challenge facing the management of internal security in Nigeria as a whole is the paucity of well-trained security operatives (Police, Army, Navy and Air Force) that can physically and intelligently meet up with the contemporary security dynamics in Jos city. Jos and indeed Nigeria unlike other developed nations is grossly under policed, considering the ratio of security personnel and the citizens. Babangida (2012) noted recently that there is a clear mismatch between Nigeria's population of 160 million and number of the security workforce, as the nation could only boast of 371,000 Policemen, 130,000 Army Officers, 15,000 Air Force Officers and 18,000 Naval officers. For a nation like Nigeria, a total number of security workforce of 534,000 is grossly inadequate to manage the growing crimes and different insurgency conditions in different parts of the country. That is why the Joint Special Task Force (JSTF) deployed to Jos have not been proactive in forestalling these attacks because they are insufficient to manage the entire city. They usually arrived at the scene of attacks after damages had been done as it severally occurred in Kuru-Karama and DogoNahauwa in the outskirts of Jos in 2010 (Search for Common Ground, 2013).

Fatalism and lack of trust in security agencies have been found to have reduced the frequency of reporting suspicious moves or plans to security operatives in Jos by the residents. A resident of Bukuru in Jos South Local Government Area stated that, "The people don't have confidence in the security. So even if we try our best to share any information with the security personnel...they will delay and not respond immediately; until it is over when they might have killed many people and destroyed a number of houses (Search for Common Ground, 2013). When the attackers are gone then they will come...Soldiers will not respond if they are 100m from an attack site, if they don't have an order. All these inefficiency makes people feel like the soldiers are complicit." He stressed that such occurrences were extremely frequent (Search for Common Ground, 2013). Therefore, the low level of furnishing security operatives in Jos with security tipoffs as a result of the loss of confidence based on their previous responses to attacks, constitute a huge challenge in crisis management without the support and confidence of the very people meant to be protect and defended.

The challenge is seen to be compounded by many episodes in which some of the perpetrators of the ethnic violence are seen wearing military or police uniforms (Africa Security Brief, 2011). While on-the-ground response has remained poor on the allegations, Government offices at the State and national levels have launched numerous studies of the violence in Jos, but with little effect (Africa Security Brief, 2011). Experts in security matters such as Amujiri (2011) is of the opinion that ethnocentrism, ethno-religious violence and insurgency germinate, takes roots and festers in an environment of abject poverty, mass illiteracy, selfishness, greediness, corruption and a yawning gap in socio-economic parity. It is argued that poverty begets hatred, hypocrisy, wickedness, jealousy and crimes in Jos. The indigenous ethnic groups in Jos want a winner takes-it-all political strategy since the return of democracy but the Jasawa community (settler) vehemently opposed political arrangement that does not favour them, relying heavily on the numerical strength of their votes, their purchasing and economic power, these has created a tense atmosphere that any slight altercation transform to a full-blown violence.

Implications of public perception on the management of internal security in Jos

The crises has divided the living pattern of Jos along religious line, UnguwanRogo, UnguwanRimi, Bauchi road, Shagari Corner, Ali Kazaure, SarkinMangu, NassarawaGwom, Rikkosetc are exclusively Muslims

settlements as a result of the recurring violence while places such as UnguwanRukuba, Tinner Junction, Apata, JentaAdamu, U-turn, Alheri, Gada-Biu, part of Tudun Wada, Rantiya, Kufangetc are absolutely inhabited by Christians. It also affected the business activities where Muslims traders refused to apply for shops in the newly constructed market in Gada-Biu for fear of their lives in an overwhelmingly Christian dominated area. Significant majority of Christian's traders left Dilimi and New Markets and relocated to Chobe junction for safety of their lives and wares. The crises had succeeded in creating an atmosphere of mutual distrust and disharmony in Jos between Christians and Muslims regardless of their ethnic affiliation, hence become easier for each side to attack the other.

The perceptions of the residents of Jos which also share ethno-religious undertones explicitly underscores the fact that the lack of trust between the two tiers of Government (Federal and Plateau State) has retarded the process of genuine search for peace and reconciliation in the affected communities and Jos as a whole (Terhembra, 2010). The military and other security personnel high-handedness and negative attitude it generated on the people in Jos during the conflict and after the crises have continued to generate bad-public image of the personnel of these security agencies that have been making the public to be reluctant in divulging critical security information to the security agencies that can help better security. After the 2008 Jos North election clash, five separate commissions of inquiry were established. Yet few if any of the resulting policy prescriptions have been implemented. Some commission reports have never even been made public. The growing impatience and diminishing expectations of many Nigerians on the commissions of inquiry, they had turned to "ritual of instituting inquiries and receiving reports that always end up in the archives." With their proliferation, they have lost credibility and have been seen to be politicized. They have been unable to obtain testimony from key sources and attract high-profile people in Jos. Some commissions have been overtly one-sided (Africa Security Brief, 2011). Increasingly fearful and suspicious communities have been turning toward non-state actors for succor. These citizens prefer to rely entirely on these groups for protection, humanitarian assistance, and reintegration of displaced persons in the aftermath of conflicts, which further amplifies the polarization resulting from indigeneship disputes. Some community organizations seem intent to hasten this polarization. Several faith-based organizations Christian and Muslim alike and many youth groups such as the Berom Youth Movement, Anaguta Youth Movement, Afizere Youth Movement, and the Jasawa Development Association have played key roles in spreading exclusionary ideologies and violence. In the absence of credible and accountable state authorities, their influence and appeal among citizens of Jos can only be expected to grow (Africa Security Brief, 2011).

It can be inferred from the above discussion that, most of the residents of Jos are discontented with internal security management of Jos crises, it has exposed the lack of political will from Jos North Local Government Council, Plateau State Government and the Federal Government on one side and the exposure of the weaknesses of our security agents to prevent the reoccurrence of violence and resolve the contentious issues that leads to crisis. Scholars like Ajaji (1988 cited in Amujiri and Agu 2013) and Eliagwu (2005) argued that several incidents have exposed the inadequacies of Nigeria's security forces in dealing with threats of vital nature to the country's security. These inadequacies, SarkinYaki Bello (2012) noted, stem on the most part, from lack of clarity of the strategic doctrines that should guide the deployment of forces. The observations of the above scholars shows that there is lack of effective and intra-agencies relationship synergy in the Nigerian security arrangements and fusion among security agencies in the management of internal security.

Summary of the findings

The major finding of this paper is that, inefficiency and ineffectiveness of security agencies in managing internal security in Nigeria is underscored by the scope, magnitude and persistence of ethno-religious violence in Plateau state and Jos metropolis in particular caused by poverty, illiteracy, ethnic and religious colouration and exploitation of political and religious disagreements and misunderstanding by the political, traditional and religious elites in order to have access to power and economic resources. The use of Hausa-Fulani referring to the entire Muslims living in Jos with the exception of Yoruba has generated a lot of sympathy from Muslims that are neither Hausa nor Fulani and vice versa from Christians that do not belong to the indigenous ethnic groups, hence the extension of the boundaries of violence beyond Berom, Hausa and Fulani longstanding conflicts. The crises had succeeded in dividing the settlement pattern and to some extent markets in Jos metropolis along religious line, thereby creating "no go areas" for both Christians and Muslims adherents. The specific findings of the paper is that, the lack of sincere conflict resolution efforts in Jos crises by the State and Federal Governments has resulted into the escalation of a once-localized confrontation between political elites of different ethnic groups into a protracted communal conflict with a strong ethnic, cultural and religious dimensions. The increasing brutality of the killings over the past fourteen years has had a traumatizing impact on the residents of Jos's economy, residential pattern of living and health care system, because when there is tension, people cannot access the hospital outside their area for fear of attacks and security restriction of movements (curfew). This has resulted into a severe breakdown of businesses, trust and communication between religious communities and ethnic groups. The high level of tensions, coupled with the accusations that

the other side is preparing for violence, and segregation severely hamper violence prevention and peace-building efforts. Such also poses a great threat to internal security of Jos metropolis. The paper has established that, the public confidence in the Nigerian security agencies is low in the management of Jos crises. A general lack of confidence of the residents of Jos in the capacity of the STF (Special Task Force) to prevent and end insecurity in the metropolis has become a common place since the 2001 crisis. The residents' lack of trust on the security agencies greatly undermine their efforts in securing the city because of the absence of public support and cooperation from the people they are meant to serve and protect.

Policy impacts and way forward

The ethno-religious crises in Jos have taken several dimensions since 2001 inimical to the security and continued survival of Jos and indeed the nation as one sovereign entity. The squabble between the Christians, Muslims, Hausa and Fulani (Jasawa community) and the indigenous ethnic groups have been spurring violent acts, resulting in numerous deaths, wanton destruction of properties, and widespread displacement of the inhabitants of the city. The daily civilian life is disrupted, forcing schools and economic activity to shut down and resulting in widespread property destruction anytime the crisis reoccurred such has also disorganized the settlement pattern of Jos city that has segmented it along religious divides. The violence in Jos has resulted into the loss of trust between communities, and their polarization along lines of ethnicity and religion, which has grown with each incident of violence. This gulf is heightened by historical animosities, as well as certain administrative practices, especially those relating to 'indigenesness' (indigene/settler dichotomy).

II. Conclusion

There is the need for the reorientation (to be neutral when deployed to crises area) and the re-training of security forces in modern technologies for combat readiness, especially the police force which lacks modern crime fighting equipment and are poorly paid making them suffer from low morale which negatively affects their performance towards national security safeguards and objectives. It is suggested by the paper that collective security strategies in security management that is holistic and realistic in planning and operation be introduced and effectively implemented so that security agents will be neutral in their national engagements. In a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic state like Plateau and Jos city in particular that has been struggling with security challenges which had pulled ethnic groups and members of Christianity and Islam apart, this paper suggests a security management strategy based on inter-dependence as a balance of power approach of proportional democracy instead of winner-takes it-all, to accommodate the interests of diverse ethno-religious and political groups that are residents of Plateau state in general and Jos metropolis in particular without considering the dichotomy of indigene/settler or Christian and Muslim faithful.

Policy recommendations

The quest for control of state power, resource allocation and land (grazing and farming) and other factors such as poverty, socio-economic marginalization, inability to accommodate all residents of Jos and lack of good governance to tackle poverty and illiteracy were all implicated in the Jos conflicts and have contributed in large measure to the politicization of ethnic, religious and citizenship identities. This paper therefore, ends with the proffering some of policy recommendations, which are likely to serve as permanent solutions to the protracted problems that have warranted this overview:

- i) Strengthening security forces' capacity to get the people's sincere support in information release proactively detect early warning signs and respond to inter-communal tensions can help to better contain any outbreaks of violence. This will require a cohesive intelligence capability that can provide local and state law enforcement units with near-time information. The means for investigating allegations of security agents' participation in ethnic violence are required to ensure accountability through stern and firm action taken against defaulting personnel.
- ii) The legal basis for indigeneship in the Nigerian constitution and Federal Character Commission should be eliminated. Originally envisioned as a means to protect traditional customs, cultures, and governance structures, the notion of indigeneity has been warped and politicized. Today, it provides an institutionalized incentive for political opportunists to build power and retain it on the basis of exclusion. In Jos, it has led to thousands of deaths and severe inter-communal hostility. The concept of indigeneship inherently divides Nigerians and undermines the democratic form of government that Nigeria aspires to uphold. Indeed, it undercuts the very notion of what it means to be Nigerian in every part of the country one wishes to reside.
- iii) A permanent, formal channel for dialogue should be established among all stakeholders involved in a particular crisis situation. The Jos crisis for example should involve the Federal Government, Plateau State governments and the groups representing the Christians, Muslims, on one hand and indigenous ethnic groups and Haus/ Fulani (Jasawa community) residing in Jos on the other. Dialogue is indeed a sine-qua-non for solving the lingering security problems in Jos. A recurring decimal in the Jos crises;

indigene-settler, Christian-Muslim dichotomy must be given adequate attention and considerations for its eventual destruction.

- iv) Religious leaders should take the responsibility for deconstructing the perceptions of existential threat to religious identity that have become entrenched in many people's daily lives in Jos. Now that Jos has managed to stay calm during the 2011 and 2015 elections, all the political elites in Jos need to tackle the Jos crisis. A heavy military presence is not a durable solution. The general public in Jos metropolis and other crises ridden areas of Plateau State, should be mobilized and sensitized regularly through interactive workshops and seminars to know the advantage of harmonious relations and the disadvantage of violence and their ugly aftermaths. All trouble shooters, instigators and culprits, no matter how highly or low placed in the society, should be made to account for their complicity through effective judicial process. There should be no scapegoats or sacred cow in a bid to finally nip in the bud the politically dressed unending Jos and Plateau state crises.
- v) Both the Plateau state and Federal Government should embark on concerted efforts in tackling poverty by compensating the victims especially those who lost their businesses, properties and deformed during the crises to enable them start a new life and employment opportunities for the idle youths who serve a foot soldiers during crises. Also mass literacy programme should be put in place to tackle the rising rate of illiteracy in the city among the youth, adult and aged which has been identified as one of the factors causing the crises to educate the youths. The security agents working to restore normalcy in Jos and beyond should be professionally sensitized to be fully cautious of their national service to avoid side due to any reason. Any defaulting agent, should be brought to book according the extant laws.

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